An access key that Cursor had issued to Fireworks AI was exposed in Fireworks' breach, and an attacker used data it reached to plant a trojanized copy of Anthropic's Claude Code extension in Cursor's extension marketplace, Cursor said on November 13. The malicious versions, 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 of Anthropic.claude-code, were available for about 11 hours on October 29. At most 5,000 users who requested those cached versions may have received them.
Cursor's disclosure says the attacker used the key to copy data from a read-only storage bucket Cursor shared with Fireworks, then used a credential found there to place the malicious copies in the cache that serves Cursor's marketplace. Anthropic did not publish the copy, and Cursor says "this was not a vulnerability in Anthropic's product." The last attacker activity it saw was on November 1, and it was blocked.
The extension went after developer machines. According to Cursor's original notice, it collected host details including username, Git email and public IP, added the attacker's SSH key to the user's authorized keys, and tried to turn on SSH and open a reverse tunnel. It set up persistence through a macOS LaunchAgent or a Windows scheduled task named "SysMon," with scripts retrying the tunnel about every minute.
The weak point was the copy in the middle. The attack never touched Anthropic or Open VSX, the source Cursor's marketplace draws from, which Cursor says "never had the malware." It hit the cache that serves the extension to Cursor users, where people see a familiar publisher name and have no way to tell where the file came from.
The damage was likely limited. Turning on SSH needs administrator rights, which the extension lacks on most Mac and Windows machines, Cursor said, and the attacker's server no longer works. Researchers found coding errors that likely kept the backdoor from working on many systems where SSH was not already on, BleepingComputer reported.
| Check | What to look for |
|---|---|
| Extension version | Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 or 2.1.313, installed or updated in Cursor on October 29 |
| macOS | an SSH key with the comment svc-telemetry in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, and an unfamiliar LaunchAgent |
| Windows | svc-telemetry in $HOME\.ssh\authorized_keys or C:\ProgramData\ssh\administrators_authorized_keys, and a scheduled task named SysMon |
Cursor is clear that removal takes more than an uninstall. "Uninstalling the extension may not be sufficient," its notice says, because the payload drops standalone scripts that keep running. It tells affected users to run its validation and cleanup scripts, remove the key, the persistence and any tunnel processes, and consider rebuilding the machine. Then rotate every credential reachable from that machine, working from a different, trusted computer.
Some customer data was exposed too. Fewer than 0.05% of users outside Privacy Mode had coding-agent traces exposed, and fewer than 0.01% of customers had API credentials exposed, Cursor said. It emailed team admins the specific keys to rotate. It says Privacy Mode users, customer repositories, its production systems, the Cursor app and its official updates, and every other marketplace extension were not affected, and no release signing keys were exposed.
Cursor took the marketplace offline and rebuilt it, deactivated the Fireworks key, moved all of its inference off Fireworks and rotated its internal credentials. "We believe the incident is contained," it said.
Fireworks is now the common thread in three disclosures. Notion said last week that the same breach exposed some Notion AI chat transcripts. Uber told California's attorney general that a service provider's compromised credentials were used to access Uber's account with that provider, The Hacker News reported, citing TechCrunch's report that the provider is Fireworks. Uber did not name it. Fireworks' own bulletin describes an October breach that reached secrets, datasets and model weights for some accounts.
Cursor is owned by SpaceX, which bought it in June for about $60 billion.
Bottom Line
If anyone on your team uses Cursor with the Claude Code extension, check for the svc-telemetry key on every machine today and rotate the credentials those machines could reach. More broadly, a key you give an AI vendor is only as safe as that vendor's own security, so give each one the narrowest access you can.
